Orders for alternative fuel concepts have remained remarkably resilient.
Robust orders do not mean the industry has settled on a unified direction.
Tightening regulatory frameworks, pressure from cargo owners and concerns over stranded assets.
Market leaders are willing to invest under uncertainty as long as the architecture is robust.
The order statistics for 2025 paint a differentiated picture. According to Clarksons Research, approximately 45 % of all newbuild orders (by tonnage) were for vessels with alternative fuel – up from approximately 35 % in 2023 and 40 % in 2024. LNG dominates with roughly 60 % of the alternative orderbook, followed by methanol at approximately 25 %, LPG at approximately 10 %, and others (hydrogen, ammonia-ready, battery-hybrid) at approximately 5 %.
In absolute numbers, an estimated 350–400 vessels with alternative propulsion were ordered in 2025, compared with approximately 300 the previous year. Notably, the overall volume of newbuild orders in 2025 was slightly declining – the share of alternative propulsion has thus grown disproportionately. This signals that the energy transition has arrived in fleet renewal, not just in pilot projects.
The distribution by vessel type shows clear patterns: container ships have the highest share of alternative orders (over 70 % of new container tonnage), followed by car carriers (approximately 60 %), cruise ships (over 80 %) and tankers (approximately 30 %). Bulkers lag at approximately 15 %, attributable to lower margins and the more conservative investment culture in this segment.
On the yard side, orders concentrate on South Korean and Chinese shipyards. HD Hyundai, Samsung Heavy Industries and Hanwha Ocean deliver the majority of LNG dual-fuel newbuilds. Chinese yards (particularly Jiangnan, New Times and Yangzijiang) have made substantial gains in methanol orders. The orderbooks of top yards extend to 2028/2029, which further tightens slot availability and keeps newbuild prices at elevated levels.
High order volumes for alternative propulsion have direct consequences for all operators – including those who have not yet ordered alternative-fuel vessels themselves. First: the service infrastructure follows the orders. With over 1,000 LNG-fuelled vessels in service, engine manufacturers are expanding their service locations, spare-part supply chains are becoming more robust, and training capacities are growing. This reduces long-term operational risks for LNG operators.
Second: standards crystallise more quickly. Each ordering wave generates feedback loops to classification societies and the IMO. The Interim Guidelines for methanol have progressed as far as they have partly because order volumes increased the pressure for standardisation.
Third: charter market dynamics are shifting. Charterers increasingly prefer vessels with better environmental credentials because they face their own compliance obligations under the EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime. Vessels without an alternative fuel option or at least fuel-ready preparation are already achieving lower rates or finding employment more difficult.
The CAPEX implications are clear: anyone ordering a newbuild now must reckon with delivery times of 3–4 years and accept prices that are 10–20 % above 2022 levels – purely from yard utilisation, in addition to the costs for alternative fuel systems.
Investment appetite varies considerably by region. European shipowners – particularly from Denmark, Norway, Germany and Greece – are investing disproportionately in alternative propulsion. The main driver is the immediate impact of EU regulation. Asian operators, particularly Japanese and South Korean lines, follow with growing commitment, driven by national decarbonisation strategies and competition for green charterers.
In China, the state-owned COSCO group has placed substantial methanol and LNG orders, giving Chinese yards additional momentum. Chinese shipowners in the bulker and tanker segments are, however, still more cautious.
The offshore sector shows its own dynamics: battery-hybrid and hydrogen pilot projects are growing here, particularly in Norway. The absolute volume is small, but innovation density is high. Insights from offshore pilots are increasingly feeding into the deep-sea discussion.
Market observation, not copying: Do not blindly copy the strategy of the majors. The resources and bargaining power of Maersk or CMA CGM do not transfer to a 10-vessel operator.
Use the infrastructure signal: If the majority of orders in your segment are for LNG or methanol, it means the service and bunkering infrastructure for these fuels will develop faster. This reduces your risk if you follow that pathway.
Factor in yard capacity: With orderbooks extending to 2028/2029, you need to secure slots early. An order placed in 2026 will likely be delivered in 2029/2030.
Red flags: Operators arguing that alternative fuels are still “too early” are ignoring the fact that over 40 % of the market has already invested. The question is no longer whether, but which pathway matches your profile.
The alternative-fuel orderbook is also a workforce problem that receives less attention than propulsion technology. Every vessel with a dual-fuel or methanol-capable engine needs officers and engineers who understand fuel changeover procedures, gas or methanol safety systems, and the additional checklists that come with a second fuel type on board. Training academies and flag administrations have not scaled at the same pace as the orderbook, and operators bringing newbuilds into service over the next few years should expect a shortage of experienced crew for these engine types, not a shortage of vessels.
Manning agencies report that officers with prior LNG or methanol experience can negotiate meaningfully higher wages, and shipowners without an internal training pipeline are competing for a small pool of qualified seafarers. Building that pipeline early — simulator time, familiarisation courses, secondment to sister vessels already in service — takes longer than ordering the ship itself. Owners who treat crew readiness as an afterthought to the newbuilding programme typically discover the gap only once the vessel is delivered and no qualified chief engineer is available to sail it. Fleet planning for alternative-fuel tonnage should run on a parallel track with recruitment and training, not behind it.
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