In operation, it is the crew that determines whether a system functions safely. New fuels change bunkering procedures, alarm patterns and emergency communication. A fuel supply system for methanol or ammonia may be technically perfectly engineered -- if the crew does not understand the alarms, does not know the valve sequences, or does not know which protective equipment to don in an emergency, the technology becomes the weak point.
This is not a theoretical warning. Experience with the first methanol-powered container vessels shows that the greatest challenges lay not in the technology but in the crew's acclimatisation. Alarm systems for low-flashpoint fuels generate considerably more notifications than conventional systems because safety margins are set more tightly. This can lead to alarm fatigue -- a condition where the crew no longer takes alarms seriously because too many false alarms occur.
Communication between bridge, engine room and deck during bunkering operations also becomes more complex. With conventional bunkering, communication is well-practised and routine. With methanol or ammonia bunkering, new elements are added: inerting, vapour management, gas detection readings, hazard zone notifications. Each of these elements requires clear communication protocols and a crew that can apply these protocols faultlessly under time pressure.
With methanol, ammonia or battery-hybrid systems, typical onboard tasks shift significantly. Engine and deck teams must collaborate more closely. In conventional operation, task division is clear: deck handles cargo and navigation, engine handles propulsion and auxiliary systems. With alternative fuels, these boundaries blur.
An example: during methanol bunkering, the deck team must monitor the bunker station and control the hazard zone, while the engine team monitors the fuel supply system, inerting and gas detection readings in the engine room. The bridge officer coordinates communication with the terminal and maintains overall oversight. All three areas must work simultaneously and in coordination -- a communication failure at any point can jeopardise the entire bunkering operation.
Watch organisation also changes: on vessels with dual-fuel systems, the watch engineer must not only monitor conventional engine operation but also fuel changeover management, gas detection systems and the specific alarm hierarchies of the alternative fuel. This considerably increases cognitive load during the watch.
The STCW baseline covers many fundamental principles but lacks the necessary depth for alternative fuels. The current STCW Convention was designed for operation with conventional fuels. The hazard properties of HFO and MGO are familiar to crews through years of experience: high flash point, no toxicity during normal contact, proven extinguishing methods. None of this applies unchanged to methanol, ammonia or hydrogen.
The manufacturer training offered during system installation is a good starting point but not a complete training concept. It typically covers operation of the specific system but not the overarching aspects: how does the fuel behave at different temperatures? How do emergency procedures change across different leakage scenarios? How is communication with the terminal conducted during a bunkering emergency?
Available simulation training also has limitations. Many simulators replicate normal operations well but are limited in emergency scenarios. The most critical situations -- a sudden ammonia leak in the engine room, a methanol fire with an invisible flame, a gas detection alarm during bunkering -- can only be partially recreated in the simulator. This is where additional tabletop exercises are needed, where the crew discusses scenarios and practises decision chains.
The right approach is multi-tiered: awareness, role-specific qualification, regular drills and integration of shore personnel. Implementation begins with an honest stocktake: what competencies does the current crew possess? Where are the gaps? Which functions are most affected?
This stocktake produces a training matrix differentiated by function and competency depth. The master needs a different training profile than the Second Engineer, and both need a different profile than an able seaman. The matrix should be reviewed annually and adapted to new requirements.
Critically, training must not be treated as a one-off event. Competence is built through repetition. Regular drills, briefings after every bunkering operation and systematic debriefings after incidents are more effective than a one-week course every two years.
In dual-fuel operation, responsibilities change across the entire onboard organisation. The Chief Engineer carries overall responsibility for the fuel supply system and must coordinate the decision on fuel changeover. This decision depends on multiple factors: availability of the alternative fuel, port regulations, emissions requirements and technical readiness of the system.
The Second Engineer is typically responsible for daily monitoring of the dual-fuel system. This encompasses checking gas detection readings, monitoring fuel inventory for both fuels, verifying ventilation systems and documenting operating parameters. For methanol systems, regular verification of the inert gas plant is additionally required.
The deck department is primarily involved during bunkering. The Chief Officer must prepare the bunker station, establish the hazard zone, conduct communication with the terminal and brief the deck crew accordingly. For methanol and ammonia, this includes providing fuel-specific PPE (chemical protection suits, breathing apparatus), positioning emergency shower stations and ensuring fire-fighting equipment is in place at the bunker station.
The bridge officer must coordinate overall communication and holds decision authority over aborting the bunkering operation in case of alarm. This responsibility requires an understanding of the overall system that goes beyond pure navigation training.
Experience from shipping companies already operating methanol-fuelled vessels provides valuable insights. The most common challenges during the initial phase: alarm fatigue from too many gas detection alarms during commissioning, crew uncertainty about the correct response to different alarm levels, and communication problems between terminal and vessel due to missing standardised bunkering protocols.
The solution that has proved effective: an experienced riding crew member or manufacturer technician accompanying the first 2-3 bunkering operations and providing hands-on familiarisation to the crew. In parallel, an increased drill frequency during the first three months, subsequently reduced to a normal level.
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