Too abstract or too alarmist. Technical decision-makers need a connection to vessel operations.
Remote access, recovery, alarm assessment and OT systems instead of abstract terms.
They anchor cyber topics in vessel operations and create clarity.
Present cyber as part of technical integrity and maintenance.
Maritime cyber communication faces a fundamental problem: most cyber literature originates from the IT world and addresses office networks, cloud infrastructure and endpoints. Maritime decision-makers – superintendents, technical directors, operations managers – read these texts and find no connection to their reality. An article about ransomware trends in the financial sector does not help a superintendent assess whether remote access to the main engine control system is securely configured.
The solution lies not in making maritime cyber texts simpler but in making them more specific. Instead of writing about generic threat landscapes, an article should name concrete systems: ECDIS, AIS, power management, ballast water control. Instead of presenting abstract risk assessments, it should ask: what happens if this system fails? Who notices? How quickly can operations be restored?
Tone is critical. Maritime decision-makers react allergically to alarmism. They deal with real risks daily – machinery failures, weather conditions, regulatory requirements – and have a low tolerance for inflated warnings without operational substance. A good cyber text treats the subject with the same sobriety as a turbocharger defect: factual, precise, solution-oriented.
A further aspect is audience differentiation. A text for the technical director must answer different questions than one for the chief engineer on board. The director needs an assessment of regulatory and financial risk. The chief engineer needs concrete instructions: which USB ports may be used, how updates are documented, when the superintendent must be informed.
Buzzwords in cyber texts are not merely an aesthetic nuisance – they have operational consequences. When an operator engages a service provider whose proposal is peppered with terms such as "holistic cyber resilience framework" or "next-generation threat intelligence" without explaining what this means for the specific vessel, an expectation gap arises. The operator believes they are comprehensively protected. In reality, they have received a generic report that takes no account of shipboard specifics.
The pattern repeats in internal presentations. When the IT department presents cyber risks to management using industry jargon, management either does not grasp the urgency or overestimates it. Both lead to wrong decisions: either too little budget or too much budget in the wrong place.
The alternative is radically simple: name systems, describe risks in operational terms and attach concrete time and cost estimates to measures. Instead of "We need to increase our cyber resilience", it becomes: "Three remote access connections on vessel X have not been deactivated since the last yard period. This costs two hours of the chief engineer's work plus one hour of coordination with the manufacturer."
Poor maritime cyber communication is identifiable by three characteristics: it uses generic threat scenarios without shipboard relevance. It recommends measures formulated for a shore-side IT department. And it concludes with a general recommendation ("increase your security level") without specifying how.
Good maritime cyber communication does the opposite. It describes a specific system (for instance, the engine manufacturer's remote access for diagnostic purposes). It explains the risk in operational terms (uncontrolled access could lead to unintended parameter changes). And it names a concrete measure with effort and responsibility.
Classification societies such as DNV and Lloyd's Register have increasingly published practical cyber guidance in recent years. BIMCO's Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships are a further good starting point. These documents demonstrate that comprehensible cyber communication is possible – if one is prepared to dispense with marketing language.
Four test questions for every cyber text before it is published or sent to management: 1) Are specific systems named or only general categories? 2) Is the risk described in operational terms – what happens in the event of failure, who is affected, how long does recovery take? 3) Are the recommended measures achievable with the resources available? 4) Would an experienced superintendent know what to do concretely after reading it?
If even one of these questions is answered with no, the text is not finished. This applies equally to one's own articles and to external reports that are commissioned. The investment in precise language pays off operationally – through better decisions, fewer misunderstandings and greater trust from the crew on board.
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