A high number can mean clustering within a few segments or corporate groups.
Segment, fuel depth, supply chain, operational profile and time horizon.
OEMs, shipowners and analysts use data driven by different interests.
Treat orderbooks as a reference framework, not as a decision template.
Orderbook figures are typically published as the number of vessels ordered with alternative fuels, often accompanied by their percentage share of total orders. The informational value of these numbers is limited, however, unless they are placed in their technical and commercial context.
The first distortion factor is the definition of alternative fuel. In many statistics, LNG-capable vessels are counted as alternative fuel orders. However, LNG is a fossil fuel with a CO2 reduction of approximately 20 to 25 per cent compared to HFO. Methane slip during combustion in four-stroke Otto-cycle engines can even eliminate the greenhouse gas advantage. If half of alternative fuel orders are LNG-capable, the total figure says little about actual decarbonisation progress.
The second distortion factor is size distribution. Ten 24,000-TEU Ultra Large Container Vessels (ULCV) represent an entirely different tonnage capacity than ten 1,800-TEU feeders. Both count as ten units in the statistics. The tonnage-weighted view yields a completely different picture: the ten ULCVs carry more than ten times the capacity of the ten feeders. Ordering statistics without tonnage adjustment systematically distort perception in favour of segments with many smaller units.
The third factor is corporate concentration. When a single group such as Maersk, CMA CGM or MSC orders 40 methanol-capable container vessels, this massively drives the total number upward but represents the decision of a single actor. The figure suggests a broad market movement that actually reflects a concentrated corporate strategy.
The fourth factor is fuel depth: many vessels ordered as dual-fuel rely in practice on conventional fuel as their primary fuel because the bunkering infrastructure for the alternative fuel is not yet sufficient. An LNG dual-fuel vessel running 90 per cent of its operational time on VLSFO is barely better in its emissions profile than a conventional vessel, yet appears in the statistics as an alternative fuel order.
The fifth factor is cancellations and options. Many orders include options for additional vessels that are sometimes counted as firm orders in the statistics. Cancellations, particularly during economic downturns, reduce actual delivery volumes but are often removed from statistics only with a delay.
If a fleet operator reads the orderbook figures uncritically, they may conclude that the market is moving quickly and they urgently need to follow. This panic reaction leads to hasty orders, often at the next available yard without sufficient technical scrutiny.
Conversely, the same figure can lead to false reassurance. If someone reads that only 15 per cent of new orders involve alternative fuels, they might conclude that the majority of the market is continuing conventionally and there is no need for action. This reading ignores segment concentration: in individual segments such as containers or ferries, the share can be 50 to 70 per cent.
Analytical reports from brokers, classification societies and consultancies use orderbook data in varying formats. Some adjust for LNG, some do not. Some weight by tonnage, some count only units. Some include options, some do not. The result: three different reports covering the same period can reach three different conclusions.
For technical managers, this means: every orderbook figure must be questioned. Which source? Which definition? Which segment resolution? Which tonnage adjustment? Only when these questions are answered does the figure carry informational value.
A European bulker operator read a broker report in early 2025 that listed 45 per cent of global new orders as alternative fuel orders. The internal conclusion: the market is moving rapidly and their own fleet of conventional Kamsarmax bulkers will soon no longer be competitive.
A deeper analysis revealed: of the 45 per cent, 60 per cent were LNG orders in the container segment, concentrated on three major shipping groups. In the bulker segment, the actual share of alternative fuels was below five per cent. Bunkering infrastructure on the operator's main routes (Brazil, Western Australia, Indonesia) was practically non-existent.
The corrected strategy looked different: no panic orders, but targeted efficiency upgrades for the existing fleet and fuel-ready engines for the next planned newbuilds in three to four years, when infrastructure is expected to have advanced further.
Five review steps for any orderbook analysis. First: segment resolution. What does the figure look like in one's own segment, not the overall market? Second: fuel definition. Are LNG, methanol, ammonia and hybrid separately reported? Third: tonnage adjustment. How is tonnage distributed, not just vessel count? Fourth: corporate concentration. How many actors are behind the figure? Fifth: infrastructure alignment. Does the ordering statistic match the bunkering infrastructure on one's own routes?
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