New systems only work when people understand them and trust them. The maritime energy transition is planned in conference rooms and shipyards, but it takes place in the engine room. A MAN ME-LGIM methanol propulsion system or a Wärtsilä 31DF LNG system may be technically mature – if the chief engineer does not trust it, he will switch to diesel mode at the first sign of doubt. And with that, the entire decarbonisation concept loses its foundation.
The IMO strategy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions sets ambitious targets: net zero by 2050. Technology is developing, regulations are taking shape, but the human element – the crew who operate these systems daily – appears on the last slides of most decarbonisation strategies.
Increased learning demands, changed routines and uncertainty. The burdens on the crew are multi-layered. First, the learning demand: new fuel systems require new knowledge in gas detection, inertisation, emergency procedures and toxicology. An engineer who has operated on HFO and MGO for 15 years must familiarise himself with topics entirely foreign to his previous experience.
Second, changed routines: bunkering with methanol or LNG differs fundamentally from HFO bunkering. Safety distances are greater, monitoring requirements higher, the consequences of an error potentially more severe. This changes the daily work routine in the engine room.
Third, uncertainty: which fuel will prevail? Will the vessel I currently work on still be operating in five years? Is my qualification future-proof? These questions occupy seafarers, even if they rarely speak about them openly.
The IGF Code and STCW Regulation V/3 form the regulatory framework for training crews on vessels with alternative fuels. Basic Training covers knowledge of fuel properties, safety systems, emergency procedures and environmental protection. Advanced Training is mandatory for officers and engineers who work directly with the fuel system.
In practice, a gap exists between regulation and training reality. Most training centres offer generic courses focused on LNG. For methanol, fewer options exist; for ammonia, almost none. Simulator-based training is available, but the number of facilities with realistic dual-fuel simulators is limited. K-Sim by Kongsberg and the Maersk Training facilities are amongst the few offering practical scenarios.
OEM-specific training is essential but often not systematically organised. A chief engineer who is to operate a Wärtsilä 50DF needs not only IGF certification but also specific knowledge of the fuel supply system, the gas valve unit and the control logic of the particular propulsion system. This knowledge is typically conveyed during newbuild delivery, but during subsequent crew changes it is often lost.
The consequence: operators who do not build systematic knowledge management for their dual-fuel fleet lose competency with every personnel change. This increases operational risk and reduces the efficiency of the new propulsion system.
The energy transition increases the probability of errors because crews are working with unfamiliar systems. This is not avoidable – learning curves are part of every technological shift. What is avoidable is that errors escalate because nobody reports them.
A functioning error culture – often referred to in the maritime context as Just Culture – means that crew members can report errors and near misses without fearing sanctions. This is particularly important with new fuel systems, where operational experience is still limited and errors contain valuable learning information.
Operators who actively promote such a culture – through training, through the leadership attitude of the master and chief engineer and through a reporting system that is actually used – will navigate the energy transition more safely than operators where errors are concealed.
The Stena Germanica, operating on methanol since 2015, and the first Maersk container vessels with methanol propulsion provide valuable insights. Initial crew scepticism was not directed at the technology itself but at the uncertainty: what happens during a methanol leak? How do I respond to a gas detection alarm? Are the emergency procedures genuinely well thought through?
After the first months, scepticism gave way to routine for most crew members. The key comprised two factors: first, sufficient training that went beyond the formal minimum, and second, the experience that the systems functioned reliably. When an alarm was triggered and the cause could be quickly identified, confidence in the system grew.
The lesson for operators: the first months on a new fuel system are the critical phase. During this period, it is determined whether the crew builds trust or develops mistrust. Investments in training and support during this phase have the greatest leverage.
Operators wishing to support the energy transition on the personnel side should assess four areas. First: is training organised for the specific systems of the fleet, or only the generic IGF certification? Second: is there a knowledge management system that prevents competency loss during personnel changes? Third: is an error culture actively promoted, particularly on vessels with new fuel systems? Fourth: are the burdens on the crew from the transition systematically captured and factored into personnel planning?
Those who cover these four areas reduce operational risk whilst simultaneously improving retention and safety performance. Those who neglect them will navigate the energy transition at greater cost and risk than necessary.
It determines how quickly new technology is accepted and operated correctly. Trust is not a soft feeling but a measurable operational factor. It determines whether an engineer operates the dual-fuel system in its optimal mode or switches to diesel out of caution. It determines whether an alarm is taken seriously or dismissed as a false trigger. And it determines whether a near miss is reported or disappears from the log.
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